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Abstract
This article explores some of  the ways in which law appropriates subversive identities. Drawing on work
from geographical, feminist and critical race approaches to property, I put forward an understanding of
property as a relation of  belonging ‘held up’ by space. Building on this understanding, I argue that identity
can operate as property in the same way that land and material objects can, and that law appropriates
subversive identities by bringing them into its hegemonic space of  recognition and regulation. 
Law’s appropriations have a range of  effects on both the individual subjects directly involved in legal
proceedings and the broader spaces in and through which those subjects forge their identities. Specifically this
article explores the appropriation of  gay and lesbian identities in the context of  immigration law, and of
aboriginal identities in the context of  Australia’s Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act
2007 (Cth) (NTNERA).
This article proposes that law appropriates subversive identities by bringing ‘outsiders’into hegemonic spaces of  belonging. It focuses on the appropriation of  lesbian
identities in the contexts of  British refugee law and on aboriginal identities in the context
of  Australia’s NTNERA respectively. The process of  appropriation involves subversive
identities, which are defined in part through their positioning outside or on the margins of
law, being brought into spaces of  legal recognition and regulation, with a wide range of
effects. This article draws on geographical, feminist and critical race approaches to property
to focus on the spatial effects of  such appropriations. The first part of  the article explores
the conceptual links between property, identity and spatiality to put forward an
understanding of  property as a spatially contingent relation of  belonging, and of
appropriation as a spatial process. The latter part of  the article builds on this understanding
of  property and appropriation through empirical studies. Through these explorations of  the
conceptual and the empirical, the article argues that law’s appropriations of  subversive
identities reshape conceptual, social and physical spaces of  belonging. Because space is
dynamic, this reshaping is not necessarily fixed or permanent; outsiders continue to build
and maintain their own spaces outside the law.
1 Lecturer in Law. With thanks to all at the Centre for Law, Gender and Sexuality at the University of  Kent, but
particularly Davina Cooper and Toni Williams, for their support during the earlier periods of  research for this
article, and to Amanda Perry-Kessaris and Mel Evans for insightful comments on an earlier draft. All errors
are mine alone.
Property, identity and belonging in space
To appropriate is to take someone else’s property and make it your own. Despite an extensive
body of  philosophical and legal literature on its meaning, property is still difficult to define.
The adjectival meaning of  appropriate – ‘suitable or proper’ – is not an etymological
coincidence. As I have discussed elsewhere,2 the understanding of  property as a suitable or
proper part or extension of  the subject has a long history in Western philosophy, most
prominently through the work of  John Locke and Georg Hegel. For Locke, property is an
inherent, essential part of  the subject (the body’s labour) and a constructed extension of  it
(the land upon which the body labours).3 For Hegel, subjectivity can only be achieved
through the process of  appropriation; the subject must acquire property in the process of
becoming fully human. Whereas Locke’s subject enters the world already possessing property
in his own labour, Hegel’s subject must achieve property through his relations with the
external world.4 Locke and Hegel have in common their definition of  property as something
that is an essential part or extension of  the proper subject (as well as an assumption that
neither women nor non-white races can be proper subjects).
Debates over what counts as property continue to be prominent across a range of
political contexts because property is still widely understood and enforced as a particularly
formidable right. Although many legal theorists have pointed out the social constructedness
of  property5 – persuasively arguing that it comprises ‘no more than socially constituted
fact’6 – most nonetheless still understand property as operating to give the subject
something fixed, permanent and incapable of  being legally interfered with by others.
Although Gray’s argument that property is ‘an illusion’ is an insightful and persuasive one,
property is nonetheless an illusion with very material effects. Most significantly, property
gives the subject the power to exclude.7 Such exclusion has material effects ranging from
urban homelessness to indigenous dispossession. Citing these effects and discussing the
ultimate power of  forced eviction that private property rights entail, Nicholas Blomley
argues that property produces geographies of  violence.8 While Locke theorised property in
terms of  a person’s relationship with a thing (land), modern property theorists have made
a point of  highlighting that ‘dominium [private power] over things is also imperium
[political power] over our fellow human beings’.9 Property entails significant social power –
it is not just an extension of  the subject, but also a relationship between subjects.
Building on and taking further these understandings of  property as a socially powerful
right of  exclusion, Cheryl Harris, in her influential 1993 piece, argues that whiteness is
property. Writing in the Unites States context but drawing on histories and arguments
applicable to other Anglo-European states, Harris outlines how property rights are rooted
in racial domination to the extent that whiteness is a form of  property.10 Slavery and
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colonial conquest – practices implemented by force and enshrined in law – established
whiteness as a prerequisite to the exercise of  enforceable property rights.11 (This is not to
say that all white people owned property, but that whiteness was one prerequisite to being
able to own property.) From the mid-1600s onwards, whiteness was established in the US
as a protected legal category which gave white subjects a wide range of  social benefits, and
from which non-white subjects were excluded. And, while slavery and conquest are no
longer legal practices,12 by essentially maintaining the status quo of  a socio-economic
system entrenched in racial inequality, law continues to recognise the settled expectations of
white people that have been built on the benefits and privileges of  white supremacy.13
Harris sees whiteness as a property right which is exercised whenever a white person takes
advantage of  the privileges accorded to white people simply by virtue of  their whiteness.14
These privileges are vast and complex.15 Harris suggests affirmative action as a means to
undermine the property interest in whiteness because this would aim to effectively diminish
the exclusiveness of  white privilege.16 According to this argument, property is both an
essential part of  the subject (one’s race) and an important relationship between subjects
(whiteness gives tangible privileges over non-whites).
Other feminist legal theorists have also explored the idea that particular identity
characteristics can function as property. Drawing on Harris’s work and on feminist
understandings of  the relational nature of  identity, Margaret Davies troubles the distinction
between ‘having’ and ‘being’ in regards to masculinity.17 Because having and being are so
culturally interwoven, Davies argues, ‘any question of  “being” must bring with it – at some
level – a question of  “having”’.18 Failure to notice the interdependence of  these ideas, she
argues, may ‘lead to the re-stereotyping or re-freezing of  the identities which are otherwise
subject to transgression’.19 Making the case for a queer theory of  property, Davies is
arguing for a conceptual linkage between identity (often understood as fixed and essential)
and ownership (often understood as transferable and impermanent). Such linkage might
allow for a de-essentialised understanding of  both property and identity, and thus for a
subversion of  the rigid ‘sameness and otherness’ which essentialised understandings
engender. As will be discussed further below, Davina Cooper has questioned the distinction
between ownership and membership in her work on property.
What these feminist and critical race scholars have in common is their argument that, as
well as offering increased access to property, belonging to particular social groups can also
itself  constitute property. This argument is in many ways consistent with the Lockean and
Hegelian understanding of  property as an essential part of  the proper subject. But whereas
these classical philosophical formulations begin with an assumed separation between the
subject and that outside it and understand property as a relation between them, the critical
theorists discussed above challenge (either implicitly or explicitly) that assumed separation.
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If  having is inextricably linked to being, if  whiteness and other identity characteristics are
property, then the subject is always already connected to that which is outside it. These
understandings of  property thus require a shift in focus away from the subject and onto the
broader spaces, relations and networks that constitute property. This shift in focus does not
imply that the subject becomes irrelevant or disappears from view, but rather that it
becomes part of  a fuller picture of  factors to be considered.
One such factor is belonging, which is in many ways the inverse of  exclusion – the
subject can exclude the world from her object because that object belongs to her. As well
as property ownership, belonging can signify membership of  a community, a relationship to
place, and/or a behaviour or identity that ‘fits’, or is ‘at home’.20 Nira Yuval-Davis describes
belonging as being about emotional attachment, about feeling safe and/or ‘at home’.21
Emily Grabham writes that belonging ‘refers to the location of  an object or person in its
“proper place” (“the book belongs on the shelf  over there” or “you belong in the UK”)’.22
Belonging thus connotes a sense of  propriety, of  the proper. To belong is to fit smoothly,
or without trouble, into either a conceptual category or a material position. It is necessarily
a relational term; an object/subject/practice/part that belongs cannot exist in a vacuum, it
must belong to or with something else.
Cooper used belonging as a way to understand the overlap between property as
ownership and property as membership in her study of  property practices at Summerhill
School, an alternative school where children choose whether or not to attend class and
where rule-making and dispute resolution involve the school body as a whole (both teachers
and children).23 Cooper found that property practices at Summerhill were constituted by a
legally pluralist regime of  institutional recognition,24 with understandings and
performances of  property being shaped by official state practices, a range of  formal and
informal school acts. Cooper describes property practices at Summerhill as involving a
number of  intersecting dimensions, of  which belonging is the most important.25 Cooper
considers belonging in two ways: firstly, the relationship whereby an object, space, or rights
over it belong to a subject (‘subject–object’); and, secondly, the constitutive relationship of
part to whole whereby attributes, qualities or characteristics belong to a thing or a subject
(‘part–whole’).26 Both types of  belonging implicate social relations and networks that
extend beyond the immediate subject and object of  property; property is instead
understood as ‘a set of  networked relations in which the subject is embedded’.27
‘Holding-up’ and different kinds of property
Cooper’s analysis of  property is spatial in that it focuses on the networks in which the
subject is embedded rather than primarily on the subject herself. Networks are necessarily
spatial; as particular arrangements of  intersecting forces or things that necessarily extend
beyond the subject, different networks (whether they be social, conceptual or physical)
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constitute the reference systems through which we locate ourselves in the world.
Geographer Doreen Massey argues that instead of  thinking of  places as areas with
boundaries around, it is more useful and accurate to imagine them as articulated moments
in networks of  social relations and understandings28 (my emphasis). In order to constitute
property, I have argued elsewhere that the set of  networked relations to which Cooper
refers must not only include one of  belonging between either subject and object or part and
whole, but also be structured in such a way that that relation of  belonging is conceptually,
socially and physically supported or ‘held up’.29 That is, the set of  networked relations that
Cooper describes must form a space that holds up the relation of  belonging.
As has been argued by Massey and other geographers, all spaces are produced by a
multiplicity of  different, dynamic forces – space is physical, social, conceptual and,
importantly, active. Put simply, relations of  belonging are held up when the wider social
processes, structures and networks that constitute space give force to those relations. By this
I mean that they are recognised, accepted and supported in ways that have a range of  effects
and consequences. For example, heterosexual relations tend to be held up by space in a
multitude of  ways that homosexual relations are not (through institutional means such as
marriage and parenting rights, through social validation such as accepting, supporting and
celebrating couples who hold hands or kiss in public, through positive media representation,
through the availability of  appropriate sex education and safe sex materials, etc.). This
holding up by space of  a relation of  belonging is more than the act of  state recognition,
which is associated with liberal identity politics, and which has been specifically critiqued for
its predetermination of  the bounds of  the propertied subject, particularly in colonial
contexts.30 While recognition, as Brenna Bhandar argues, ‘fails to escape the violence
inherent in colonial spatial and temporal orders’,31 the concept of  holding-up is directly
concerned with these orders.
The understanding of  belonging as between part and whole (the second in which
Cooper considers belonging) is something of  a departure from traditional and legal
understandings of  property, but resonates strongly with Harris’s analysis of  whiteness as
property. Using the analysis of  part–whole belonging, whiteness can be understood as
property because the property holder is embedded in certain social relations and networks
of  belonging. A white person can enjoy the privileges of  whiteness because he or she
belongs to the various social relations and networks that constitute whiteness. As
sociologists such as Ruth Frankenberg have shown, those relations and networks are
complex and far-reaching. Whiteness, like all identity categories, is socially constructed
through historically specific fusions of  political, economic and other forces.32 Whiteness in
turn ‘constructs daily practices and worldviews in complex relations with material life’.33
That is, whiteness is productive of  subjectivities. So while whiteness can be understood as
belonging to the white subject as Harris argues (whiteness as property in the sense of
subject–object belonging), the white subject also belongs to the complex relations and
networks that form whiteness (whiteness as property in the sense of  part–whole belonging).
This analysis suggests that, in order to understand the varied social powers of  property,
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both subject–object and part–whole belonging must be considered. In policy terms, this
analysis means that, if  the normative goal is to challenge the way whiteness (or another
identity category) operates as a structure of  exploitation and oppression, then it is the
relations and networks that form whiteness which must be changed rather than the
individual subjects who belong to those relations and networks.
Law’s appropriations of subversive identities
What does this understanding of  property mean for law? On one level, understanding
property as a relationship of  belonging held up by space demonstrates that property is not
defined by law alone. Cooper’s study showed that property at Summerhill was constituted
through a range of  social norms, rules and relations rather than through law alone. On
another level, understanding property as a relationship of  belonging held up by space also
reveals the spatiality of  the state co-optation of  identity politics, which I will argue below
can be usefully understood as law’s appropriations of  subversive identities. Both insights
offer a way of  understanding the political effects of  law that is different from the insights
of  socio-legal work that takes individual legal subjects – or the similarly grouped subjects
of  liberal identity politics – as the focus of  its analysis. Widening the lens of  analysis out
from the subject and onto the spaces of  belonging in which the subject exists (and, as will
be argued below, through which the subject is constituted) brings into view physical, social
and conceptual effects of  law that tend to be overlooked in socio-legal approaches and in
other analyses that focus on the subject (or on groups of  subjects). Bringing this
understanding of  property to law shows how politics of  co-optation are not just about the
co-optation of  individual subjects or groups, but also about shifting the space in which
those subjects or groups were able to emerge as a potentially subversive force.
There is now an expansive critical literature on the ways in which the state and other
institutions have co-opted different kinds of  identity politics. Identity politics is a broad
term that encompasses a range of  causes based on the shared experiences of  injustice of
members of  particular social groups.34 Identity politics were essential to the civil rights
movement in the United States, to the attainment of  equal legal rights for women, and to
many other hugely significant social changes over the past century. In recent decades,
however, there has been increasing criticism of  identity politics and a decided theoretical
shift away from them.35 One of  the main critiques is that identity categories, such as
‘woman’, ‘black’ and ‘gay’, are social constructs that do not have natural or universal
meanings. To take the first example, Simone de Beauvoir’s now classic assertion that ‘one is
not born, but rather becomes, a woman’36 has been definitively confirmed by successive
generations of  feminist writers who have debunked ideas that women can be defined
through their genitalia, appearance or sexual preference, and explored the multiple ways in
which women (and men) learn to perform their genders.37 It is thus unclear who is inside
and outside any particular category, and those who do fall inside the categories will not
necessarily have a strong base of  shared experience.38 There has also been critique of  the
scale of  change that identity politics is capable of  producing. The elements of  identity
politics that have gained most traction in mainstream political praxis are liberal campaigns
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that have as their goal the improvement of  conditions and the extension of  rights for that
particular identity category, rather than the broader goal of  shifting the very systems that
produce identity categories and their differential conditions. As Wendy Brown argues:
politicised identities generated out of  liberal, disciplinary societies, insofar as they
are premised on exclusion from a universal ideal, require that ideal as well as their
exclusion from it, for their own perpetuity as identities.39
That is, liberal identity politics aims at inclusion within a system rather than at systemic change.
Related to, and in some cases as part of  this critique of  identity politics, is a specific
critique of  law’s co-optation of  such politics. There have, for example, been critiques of
race politics in the US in the post-civil-rights era, pointing to the de-radicalisation of  the
Black movement and arguing that the achievement of  formal legal equality gives the illusion
of  substantive equality. The reality of  substantive inequality along the lines of  race persists
and is covered up and thus to an extent protected by law.40 The recognition of  indigenous
land rights in the courts of  settler colonial states such as Australia and Canada has also been
critiqued for its ultimate re-inscription of  colonial power over indigenous difference and
resistance.41 The passage of  hate crime laws to ‘protect’ women, sexual and racial minorities
has come under considerable critique for its reliance on and bolstering of  the deeply racist
and sexist prison industrial complex.42 And even relatively conservative feminist voices have
pointed out that ‘gender mainstreaming’ in international law has allowed claims to equality
to be tamed and de-radicalised.43 By including and ostensibly protecting particular
articulated interests of  a range of  marginalised identity groups, law improves the situations
of  only the most privileged of  such groups while ignoring the most oppressed and
preserving the overarching systems that produce such oppression and marginalisation.
Thinking spatially: co-optation as appropriation
From a spatial perspective, law’s co-optation of  identity politics can be understood as
occurring in part due to an implicit construction of  space as static, closed and singular. This
implicit understanding is prevalent in Western philosophy44 and is shared by law and by the
elements of  identity politics that come to be co-opted. Legal geographers have consistently
critiqued law for its assumption that space is the static, neutral backdrop to legal action.45
Similarly, liberal identity politics (which tend to be the elements of  identity politics that are
co-opted by law) have been critiqued for being ‘single axis’,46 disconnected from grassroots
struggles and lacking in genuine intersectionality (that is, lacking in an understanding of  the
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complex ways in which different systems of  oppression, such as class, race and gender,
intersect to form the conditions of  people’s lives).47
One effect of  this construction of  space as static, closed and singular is that time is
envisaged as an interconnected, homogeneous configuration of  movement from one
moment to the next – time as a singular universal trajectory of  becoming, which operates
over smooth, static, ideologically closed space.48 These understandings of  time and space
in turn support a view of  history and ‘development’ as an inevitable march towards a
common goal. As Massey puts it, ‘coexisting heterogeneity is rendered as (reduced to)
place in the historical queue’, and difference is neatly packed into bounded spaces and
dismissed to the past, which is implicitly understood as singular – as our past.49 Thus
migrants from ‘developing’ countries are seen as arriving not only from the peripheries, but
also from the past.50 This understanding of  space and time similarly supports an
understanding of  development and globalisation as an inevitable temporal sequence –
poor nation states and those in early stages of  capitalism are understood as ‘catching up’
rather than as being involved in current practices and relations of  increasing inequality and
oppression.51 Single-axis identity politics also tend to construct identity groups as needing
to catch up with the majority, that is, to be included in a political and legal space that is
‘advanced’ and ‘modern’.52
Relegating spatial difference to temporal sequence means constructing as inevitable
both the present and the future for those who are ‘behind’ in the queue, because the
singular, linear temporal trajectory is already determined. Similarly, relegating identity
difference to a need for inclusion into a pre-existing political space means constructing as
inevitable the dominance of  that pre-existing space. Understanding space as active and
multiplicitous rather than static and singular enables an analysis of  law’s co-optation of
subversive identities that escapes the inevitability of  the dominance of  law’s space. Such co-
optations are not just about bringing individual subjects or groups inside a dominant space,
but also about shifting the space in which such individuals and groups are embedded. These
co-optations are thus not just a matter of  bringing outsiders in, but about reshaping and
reducing the outside. Such reshaping and reduction affects what relations of  belonging will be
held up in the future. These processes are not simply co-optations of  groups and individuals
but appropriations of  subversive identities and corresponding reshapings of  the spaces that
once held them up. Yet, because space is active and multiplicitous, such appropriations are
never fixed or complete; reshaping is an ongoing process, as is resistance to law’s
appropriations. I will now discuss two instances of  law’s appropriation of  subversive
identities through the shaping of  spaces of  belonging.
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Refugee law’s appropriation of ‘the subversive queer woman’
The picture that Western governments, media and liberal non-governmental organisations
generally paint of  refugee law – particularly in relation to claims made on the basis of
sexuality persecution – is one of  racialised gays and lesbians fleeing vaguely defined but
implicitly demonised ‘repressive regimes’ to find sanctuary in tolerant, liberal Western states
that open their borders as a charitable act of  ‘human rights protection’.53 Such
representations exist in part because of  the very structure of  refugee law, which demands a
unitary, discrete subject who can travel outside her home country, file a claim for asylum and
prove that it would be highly dangerous to go back. The Convention Relating to the Status
of  Refugees 195154 was drawn up in the post-Second World War era as part of  a suite of
new international legal instruments based on liberal notions of  human rights and equality.55
State signatories to the Convention are obliged to provide protection for individual subjects
who have successfully fled their home state and are unable or unwilling to return due to a
‘well-founded fear of  being persecuted for reasons of  race, religion, nationality,
membership of  a particular social group or political opinion’ (Article 1 as amended by the
1967 Protocol). It is now an accepted tenet of  refugee law in particular states including
Australia, Britain and Canada that sexual orientation and gender identity can constitute a
‘particular social group’ within the meaning of  the Convention56 and that, accordingly,
individuals who leave their home countries because they have a well-founded fear of
sexuality-based persecution should not be forced to return there.57
While there has been research published on the legal position of  queer asylum seekers
and the particular difficulties they face in the refugee determination process,58 and on the
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problems facing women claiming refugee status,59 this research has remained largely within
the framework of  single-axis identity and recognition rather than positing a broader critique
of  the system itself. Despite the abolition of  the discretion requirement, refugee law
continues to require the performance of  a very particular sexuality for asylum to be granted.
As will be discussed in this section, that sexuality is overwhelmingly based on Western
commercial understandings of  gay men. Building on the conceptual discussion above, this
section shows how refugee law can be understood as appropriating the potentially
subversive property of  the queer woman asylum seeker. The asylum seeker’s property in this
context is her identity, her part–whole belonging. She is persecuted in her home state
because of  her queer sexuality and non-normative gender performance. In travelling to the
receiving state, she has the potential to produce subversive property there – by asserting that
her queer sexuality and non-normative gender performance should be held up in the
receiving state. However, the asylum seeker must perform her identity in a very particular
way. The same properties that made her subversive, disruptive, even inflammatory in her
home state must be shown to be properties that make her a worthy citizen in the receiving
state. In demanding proof  of  a particular lesbian identity legible to a Western court, the
receiving state requires the asylum seeker to shift the way she performs her identity, while
positioning itself  as a haven of  salvation and generosity. Many refugee lobby groups also
adopt these saviour discourses, bolstering neocolonial ideas about sending and receiving
states.60 Through this legal process the receiving state appropriates the asylum seeker’s
potentially subversive property and uses it as means by which to further develop its own
space of  belonging.
For an applicant to prove her sexuality, she must give details such as when she first
thought she was a lesbian, all of  the intimate relationships and feelings she has had with and
for other women, how she managed to hide those feelings and relationships and what
happened to her as a consequence if  she did not manage to do so, along with anything else
that the decision maker hearing the case thinks is relevant to authenticating her lesbian
identity. Although queer asylum seekers still assert agency in the courtroom, acting tactically
in the face of  overwhelming legal formulism,61 refugee law ultimately requires ‘real lesbians’
to either be participants in the pink economy and publicly perform their sexuality like gay
men, or alternatively to be caring maternal women whose sexuality is an almost invisible
part of  their identity.62 For example, a Mongolian woman seeking asylum in Australia on
the basis of  sexuality persecution was asked by the Refugee Review Tribunal to gives names
and addresses of  ‘gay locations’ in both Mongolia and Australia, and to disclose whether
she had yet acquired a local woman lover in Sydney.63 The tribunal then asserted that
conditions for gays and lesbians in Mongolia had been improving in recent years, citing as
authority the Spartacus Guide, a commercial travel guide aimed at Western gay men
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planning holidays abroad. In a Canadian case, a Russian woman seeking asylum tried to use
receipts from the Toronto gay village to prove her lesbian sexuality.64 The Immigration and
Refugee Board took issue with the fact that only some of  the receipts were for transactions
paid by debit and or credit card, and that only some ‘had an air-miles card number on them’.
The board found that her inability to show with certainty that the payments were made
directly by her meant that she did not make any of  the payments herself, and that, ‘on a
balance of  probabilities’, she was not really a lesbian.
These cases demonstrate that women claiming asylum on the basis of  sexuality
persecution must prove that they fit into a particular Western lesbian identity category that
is constructed as universal. In terms of  part–whole belonging, refugee law produces a
lesbianism ‘whole’ of  which applicants must prove they are a part. In so doing it also
(re)produces a space of  belonging that holds up one particular way of  being a queer woman.
Apart from the obvious problems with assuming that asylum seekers will be financially able
to make ‘gay purchases’, practically able to name ‘gay locations’, and culturally able to make
social connections as soon as they arrive, the requirement that these women perform their
sexuality in this commercial, public way also ignores the reality that the asylum-seeking
subject has by definition come from a space where her queer sexuality was not held up,
indeed, where it was unsafe for her to publicly show her sexuality. Refugee law’s requirement
of  the performance of  this particular lesbian sexuality not only accounts, to some extent, for
the relative invisibility of  women (compared to men) making claims for asylum on the basis
of  sexuality,65 but also dictates and thereby reproduces a mode of  being lesbian that fits with
state interests in consumerist economics and easily definable and visible minority
communities. Overt queer sexuality, the very aspect of  identity that made the subject
subversive and put her at risk in her home state, is made into a normative property defined
by courts using commercial, masculine standards. Such cases also demonstrate the overlap
between property as part–whole and subject–object belonging, for, to have her (part–whole)
lesbian identity held up, the applicant must own particular objects and move in or ‘master’
social and physical space in a particular way (subject–object belonging). In requiring the
asylum seeker to behave and consume in particular ways, refugee law shifts the asylum
seeker’s queer sexuality from being a property that unsettled and was potentially subversive
of  the (sending) state to one that bolsters the broad agenda of  the (receiving) state.
By requiring queer women asylum seekers to perform this particular version of  lesbian
identity, refugee law takes what was the subversive property of  the asylum seeker and
reorients it such that it becomes part of  the property of  the receiving state. While the
asylum seeker’s sexuality unsettled the space from which she came – unsettled that space to
the point where she could not safely remain there – refugee law requires her to perform her
sexuality in a way that reinforces the hegemonic space of  belonging of  the receiving state.
While this performance fits with and strengthens the growing space of  ‘homonationalist’
belonging,66 the asylum seeker can be left isolated within refugee communities.67 The space
of  belonging produced by court decisions on asylum claims made by women on the basis
of  sexuality persecution is one in which the nation state is solidly shaped with clearly
delineated physical boundaries. Refugee law proceeds on the basis that a subject either
belongs or does not, and that belonging is determined by law alone. Indeed, the lesbian
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subject produced by refugee law functions in a similar way to the figure of  the woman in
some human rights discourses, as has been critiqued by Inderpal Grewal and others68 – as
objects of  charity capable of  being saved from their own state’s repressive regimes and
converted to sexual citizenship, which can be done through consumerism. Refugee law
appropriates the subversive property of  the lesbian asylum seeker and produces a space that
holds up particular racialised, gendered and sexualised identities.
One circumstance that is never taken into consideration by receiving courts and
tribunals is the effect that their decision about the particular applicant before them will have
on the space she leaves behind. Of  course, the very structure of  refugee law prevents this
type of  consideration from being taken into account – the Refugee Convention is
concerned with individual ‘human beings’ enjoying ‘fundamental rights and freedoms’, and
with ‘the problem of  refugees’ not becoming ‘a cause of  tension between states’.69 It is not
concerned with the complex forces and power structures that have caused the sending state
to be a dangerous place for queer women, or with the future of  those ‘outside’ spaces. Yet,
the operation of  refugee law has broad spatial effects – by enabling the permanent
departure of  dissident queer subjects on the condition that those subjects present their
home states as uniformly and impossibly homophobic, refugee law leaves undisturbed and
even bolstered, the gendered and heteronormative networks of  belonging that make that
space unlivable for queer women. The important work of  local groups’ resistance to
homophobia and sexism must necessarily be deemed inadequate by the courts of  the
receiving state in order to construct the sending state as a uniformly and impossibly
unlivable space for queer women. Yet, in reality, such groups continue to work to produce
spaces that do hold up queer relations of  belonging, with such spaces often being
strategically out of  the view and reach of  law, and outside the understanding of  Western
‘experts’.70 Although a positive refugee decision makes a significant and welcome difference
in the lives of  the individual applicant, it leaves unquestioned the spaces of  belonging that
cause queer women to move in the first place. Refugee law appropriates the subversive
property of  the lesbian asylum seeker and produces spaces that hold up particular racialised,
gendered and sexualised identities.
Property law’s appropriation of ‘the subversive aboriginal person’
Moving now from a socio-legal area generally framed in terms of  international migration
and mobility to one generally framed in terms of  domestic relations and stasis, this section
examines law’s appropriation of  subversive identities in the context of  indigenous land
rights. It is already fairly well established that the law of  settler colonial states facilitates
legitimises and relies upon the appropriation of  indigenous land and mineral resources.71
Patrick Wolfe and others argue that settler colonialism has as its goal the elimination of  the
native, and this argument certainly holds weight when considered in light of  the ongoing
policies of  punishment, control and removal of  indigenous people that are prevalent in
settler colonial states.72 With the advent of  the non-profit industrial complex and its focus
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4n human rights,73 along with UN concern for the treatment of  indigenous peoples,74 state
laws aimed at the actual physical or cultural genocide of  indigenous peoples are untenable.
However, focusing on the Australian government’s recent legislation enabling the
compulsory acquisition of  leases of  aboriginal land in the Northern Territory, I argue in this
section that law instead functions to appropriate subversive aboriginal identities. This
process includes the appropriation of  aboriginal culture, but extends further. Aboriginal
identities are appropriated through the reshaping of  aboriginal spaces of  belonging. What
is at stake in these leases is more than the land over which the leases are sought – it is also
the social and cultural characteristics of  the communities that live on the land. The
resistance to the leases and the insistent claim of  aboriginal communities that ‘we are not
moving’ goes beyond an insistence on staying in the same physical place and extends to an
insistence that that place remains a space of  aboriginal belonging.
The Northern Territory ‘intervention’ is the name used to describe the set of  policies
introduced by the Australian Commonwealth government in August 2007. The intervention
was primarily enabled by the NTNERA. The Act followed a report by the Northern
Territory government entitled Little Children are Sacred, which contained allegations of
widespread child sex abuse in remote aboriginal communities in the territory.75 The
Northern Territory is commonly regarded as the ‘most aboriginal’ area of  Australia because
it has the highest aboriginal proportion of  its population of  any Australian jurisdiction (over
30 per cent compared to the next highest 3.8 per cent),76 the highest number of  native title
land claims,77 and is the site of  the first and most significant aboriginal land rights
legislation in Australia (around 45 per cent of  the area of  the Northern Territory is now
aboriginal – owned under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth)
(Land Rights Act), which is higher than in any other jurisdiction).78 Unlike the rest of
Australia, the remote aboriginal communities of  the Northern Territory are areas where
white Australians may feel out of  place.
The Northern Territory is one of  two mainland Australian territories, the other being
the small area around the federal capital of  Canberra, and, although the territories are now
self-governing, they are still subject to having their laws overridden by the Commonwealth
government – a level of  intrusion from which the Australian states are immune. This
Commonwealth power to override territory laws is enabled by s 122 of  the Australian
Constitution. Drawing on this power, the Commonwealth government announced on
21 June 2007 that the levels of  child sex abuse in the Northern Territory’s aboriginal
communities had become a national emergency to which the Northern Territory
government had failed to adequately respond. As such, the Commonwealth government
was to immediately pass emergency response legislation.
Bringing the outside(r) in: law’s appropriation of subversive identities
73 A Smith, ‘Introduction: The Revolution Will not be Funded’ in Incite! Women of  Colour Against Violence (ed), The
Revolution Will not be Funded: Beyond the Non-Profit Industrial Complex (South End Press 2007).
74 J Anaya, Observations on the Northern Territory Emergency Response in Australia (United Nations Special Rapporteur
on the Situation of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of  Indigenous People 2010).
75 P Anderson and R Wild, Little Children are Sacred: Inquiry into the Protection of  Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse
(Northern Territory Government 2007).
76 A Statistical Overview of  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples in Australia (Australian Human Rights
Commission 2008) <www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/statistics/index.html#Heading34> accessed
15 February 2010.
77 ‘Northern Territory’ (National Native Title Tribunal 2010) <www.nntt.gov.au/Native-Title-In-
Australia/Pages/Northern-Territory.aspx> accessed 15 February 2010.
78 B A West and F T Murphy, A Brief  History of  Australia (Infobase Publishing 2010) 85.
311
The NTNERA introduced a range of  highly paternalistic measures to large areas of  the
Northern Territory. These measures apply to ‘prescribed areas’ of  the Northern Territory,
which are defined in the Act as all aboriginal land,79 as well as any other area declared by
the relevant minister, with the exact co-ordinates for the prescribed areas listed in a schedule
to the Act.80 All prescribed areas are those of  aboriginal communities.81 The NTNERA
measures applicable in the prescribed areas include: a total ban on the possession and
consumption of  alcohol;82 compulsory income management for all welfare recipients;83
compulsory installation of  anti-pornography filters on all public computers as well as
obligatory record-keeping of  all computer users;84 cutting back of  the permit system for
entry onto aboriginal land;85 federal government takeover of  local services and community
stores as well as a ministerial power to suspend all elected councillors;86 a ban on Northern
Territory courts from taking customary law into account when dealing with bail applications
and sentencing;87 and compulsory rent-free five-year leases of  aboriginal land to the federal
government.88 The NTNERA made itself  exempt from Australia’s Racial Discrimination
Act 1975 (Cth).89
In terms of  aboriginal resistance to the intervention, the compulsory leases were the
focus of  anti-intervention campaigns, at least in the legal arena. Notably, traditional owner
Reggie Wurridjal brought a High Court challenge against the Commonwealth government,
claiming that the lease of  the Maningrida land on which he lived amounted to an unjust
compulsory acquisition of  property, contrary to s 51(xxxi) of  the Constitution. Along with
other aboriginal elders, Wurridjal was recognised under the Land Rights Act as a traditional
owner of  the land in question. Like all land under the Act, the fee simple title is held by an
Aboriginal Land Trust for the benefit of  the relevant aboriginal people. The township of
Maningrida was established as an instrument of  government policy in 1957.90 While many
aboriginal people have moved to the township of  Maningrida itself, many also continue to
live in outstations on the region, of  which there are over 30.91 The Bawinanga Aboriginal
Corporation operates a large and successful aboriginal employment scheme whereby those
living on the Maningrida outstations are paid to maintain them.92 Due to the relatively short
history of  white settlement and the relatively well-resourced support of  outstation living,
aboriginal residents’ relationship with land in the Maningrida region is stronger than in
other parts of  Australia and is also robustly defended in the face of  encroaching white
governance. In a long and complex decision, the High Court found that the compulsory
lease of  the Maningrida area did not effect any acquisition of  property from Wurridjal
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himself, and that, although the leases did acquire property from the Land Trust, that
acquisition was on just terms.93
From a property law perspective, the leases were unusual in many respects but notably
in that, although they granted the Commonwealth ‘exclusive possession and quiet
enjoyment of  the land while the lease is in force’,94 the Commonwealth never sought to
enforce this right. Government officials made a point of  publicly insisting that the leases
did not amount to a land grab.95 Indeed, then Prime Minister John Howard said, in reaction
to land grab allegations, that ‘we’re offering a guarantee that we’re not taking anything from
anybody. We’re trying to give things back.’96 The question then is what was the government
taking, or at least trying to take, through these compulsory leases. The government asserted
that the leases ‘help to expand opportunities for business investment such as farming,
tourism and retail businesses and home ownership’ and ‘offer opportunity for economic
development and better housing and infrastructure’ for the benefit of  the existing aboriginal
communities.97 In terms of  better housing and infrastructure, part of  the government’s
argument for why it needed leases of  the land was that having long leases meant that it
would not have to go through bureaucratic approval processes in order to make repairs on
houses and impose maintenance conditions on individual renters.98 The minister stated that
the leases would also allow the government to promote private home-ownership in
aboriginal communities rather than the communal title under which almost all aboriginal
land is currently held.99
Anti-intervention campaigners pointed out that, contrary to the Commonwealth’s stated
objectives, housing for aboriginal people in the prescribed areas did not improve under the
intervention leases, and any economic development has been negligible.100 However, while
activists were understandably sceptical that the government control of  housing enabled by
the leases would come to mean ‘higher rents, more restrictive tenancy conditions and easier
eviction’,101 there was no clear evidence that the Commonwealth used its leases to directly
push residents out of  their homes.102 The Commonwealth government’s rationale for the
five-year leases shifted over time and was generally ambiguous.103 Paddy Gibson argues that
the leases were an attack on the gains won in the aboriginal land rights struggle, namely
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‘aboriginal control over their own lives’.104 However, that control had already been taken on
a far more direct and dramatic level with other provisions in the intervention such as the
total ban on alcohol and compulsory income management. The fact that the leases seemed
from the start to be mainly symbolic (because the government made clear its lack of
intention to take up its right to exclusive possession) and yet have been the most contested
aspect of  the intervention suggests that the government was still ‘taking’ something; that
there was a materiality to the ‘symbolic’ property being acquired.
The property being acquired or ‘taken’ through the compulsory leases was aboriginal,
not just in terms of  the type of  legal title the land was held under, the identity of  the
claimants or the majority racial group living on the land, but also in terms of  the broader,
contested space of  belonging of  post-contact Australia. What was being appropriated
through the intervention leases was not so much the right to exclusive possession of  the
land in the prescribed areas, as it was the holding up of  aboriginal identities in those spaces.
A group of  aboriginal activists called the Prescribed Area Peoples’ Alliance released a
statement following a meeting in June 2009 stating, that the intervention measures ‘are
pushing us into a corner. That will mean they will take away everything we belong to . . . If
people are forced to leave off  homelands they will lose everything, their identity.’105 This
reference to aboriginal identity, and to ‘everything we belong to’ (emphasis added)
demonstrates the part–whole belonging that is at stake here – although the lease in question
in Wurridjal v The Commonwealth clearly involved a change in which subject the object
belonged to, what was more important to the aboriginal people affected by the leases was
the threatened change in the whole (culture) of  which they were a part. The space of
belonging produced by property in the leases affects both the control of  the land and the
subjectivities of  those who live on it. The appropriation of  aboriginal identity through the
reshaping of  spaces of  aboriginal belonging was at stake.
The term ‘homelands’ is instructive, as is the spatial reference to being ‘pushed into a
corner’. Although various definitions exist, the key characteristics of  homelands are that
they are aboriginal-initiated, permanent communities that are distant from non-aboriginal
settlements both cartographically and culturally.106 Beyond its geographical meaning, the
idea of  homelands captures something of  the spatial understanding of  property, the
subject–object and part–whole belonging, the importance of  land and the importance of
home and the connection between them. Homelands are spaces of  aboriginal belonging
where being aboriginal is held up. Because they are not just a set of  physical places but
rather a space of  aboriginal belonging, the homelands can be depleted both physically and
culturally – by being forced to move from one location to another and also by having their
distinctive characteristics maligned or dissolved. At the same time though, the homelands
are a space that cannot be annihilated by compulsory leases or bulldozers alone. Like all
spaces, the homelands are not frozen in time, but will shift and adapt from moment to
moment, and across physical locations.
The homelands are a kind of  subversive property in that the relation of  belonging
between aboriginal people and their land and culture – a relation that is out of  place
according to dominant Australian understandings of  what and who belong where – is held
up in the homelands. In response to the intervention, one remote Northern Territory
aboriginal community held on to its subversive property by physically moving and taking its
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space with it. This is the community of  Ampilatwatja, located some 300km north-east of
Alice Springs. Ampilatwatja is a community of  the Alyawarr people and land.107 In June
2009 the people of  the Ampilatwatja community, supported by several Australian trade
unions, walked off  their town site in protest against the intervention, and started building
new accommodation and infrastructure on a site 3km away, just outside the boundaries of
the intervention’s ‘prescribed areas’.108 Despite its physical move, the Ampilatwatja
community retained its space of  belonging, which is no doubt altered from what it was at
the last site but is still a space where aboriginal bodies and cultural practices belong.
Spokespeople from the walk-off  site have emphasised their rejection of  the government’s
regime, their spiritual connection to the land and intention to live under their own customs
and laws forever.109 Walk-off  spokespeople have, for example, stated to the government
that ‘we’re never ever going to go back to that community to live under your controls and
measures’;110 and that their action of  walking outside the borders of  the prescribed areas:
leads us not to Canberra but to Country, not to further assimilation through
dependency but to a continuing way of  life, not to western law but to our own,
not to hand fed scraps and the confines and indignities of  the ration mentality
and manufactured ‘real economies’ but to self  reliance, learning by doing and
direct responsibility for self, Family and the coming generations.111
The Ampilatwatja people’s location and declaration that they will not be moving unsettled
the Commonwealth government112 and created ripples of  media attention.113 Theirs is a
claim to property, not just in the sense that the land which they have moved to belongs to
them, but also in the sense that as a community they are part of  an aboriginal culture
distinct from the dominant non-aboriginal cultures of  wider Australia. It is a claim that their
space of  belonging should prevail, that their relation of  belonging to their land and culture
should be held up. Whereas the Wurridjal v The Commonwealth case challenged the
government’s power to take property in aboriginal land, the walk-off  literally moved away
from the law and took the community’s aboriginal space of  belonging with it.
Conclusion: law’s appropriations and the spatiality of identity
The socio-legal issues of  sexuality-based asylum claims and of  compulsory leases of
aboriginal land in Australia have in common a contestation over property – both involved
attempts to assert that particular relations of  belonging should be held up in particular
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spaces. In regards to the leases, that contestation was over whether aboriginal or Anglo-
Australian spaces of  belonging would be dominant in the remote communities of  the
Northern Territory. In regards to the cases of  women claiming asylum on the basis of
sexuality persecution, that contestation was over what kinds of  sexualities will be held up and
afforded a space within the receiving state. Whereas the Australian cases involved assertions
of  subversive (aboriginal) property and the refugee cases involved the reorientation of  what
was a subversive (queer) property, both sets of  cases demonstrate the significant, pervasive
social power of  property – its production as well as requirement of  particular spaces of
belonging. These studies show the complexity of  the relationship between property,
identity, belonging and space. Law appropriates subversive identities by reshaping the spaces
that hold up those identities. The spatial understanding of  property as belonging put
forward in this article can be used to illuminate the ways in which law appropriates
subversive identities, which operate as property on both subject–object and part–whole
levels. However, while law appropriates, resistance continues on the outside, through the
building and maintenance of  spaces that hold up subversive relations of  belonging.
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